Maher v. Roe
432 U.S. 464 (1977)

Paul J. Wahlbeck, George Washington University
James F. Spriggs, II, Washington University in St. Louis
Forrest Maltzman, George Washington University
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judgment.

I do not read any decision of this Court as requiring a State to finance a nontherapeutic abortion. The Court's holdings in Roe and Doe, supra, simply require that a State not create an absolute barrier to a woman's decision to have an abortion. These precedents do not require that the State assist her in procuring it.

From time to time, every state legislature determines that, as a matter of sound public policy, the government ought to provide certain health and social services to its citizens. Encouragement of childbirth and child care is not a novel undertaking in this regard. Various governments, both in this country and in others, have made such a determination for centuries. In recent times, they have similarly provided educational services. The decision to provide any one of these services—or not to provide them—is not required by the Federal Constitution. Nor does the providing of a particular service require, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the provision of another.

Here, the State of Connecticut has determined that it will finance certain childbirth expenses. That legislative determination places no state-created barrier to a woman's choice to procure an abortion, and it does not require the State to provide it. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

The District Court held:

"When Connecticut refuses to fund elective abortions while funding therapeutic abortions and prenatal and postnatal care, it weights the choice of the pregnant mother against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right to an elective abortion. . . . Her choice is affected not simply by the absence of payment for the abortion, but by the availability of public funds for childbirth if she chooses not to have the abortion. When the state thus infringes upon a fundamental interest, it must assert a compelling state interest." 408 F. Supp. 660, 663-664 (1975).

This Court reverses on the ground that "the District Court misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental right recognized in Roe [v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973)]," ante, at 7, and therefore that Connecticut was not required to meet the "compelling interest" test to justify its discrimination against elective abortion but only "the less demanding test of rationality that applies in the absence of . . . the infringement of a fundamental right," ante, at 13. This holding, the Court insists, "places no obstacles—absolute or otherwise—in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion"; she is still at liberty to finance the abortion from "private funds." Ante, at 9.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

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This Court reverses on the ground that "the District Court misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental right recognized in Roe [v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973)]," ante, at 7, and therefore that Connecticut was not required to meet the "compelling interest" test to justify its discrimination against elective abortion but only "the less demanding test of rationality that applies in the absence of... the infringement of a fundamental right," ante, at 13. This holding, the Court insists, "places no obstacles—absolute or otherwise—in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion"; she is still at liberty
April 28, 1977

75-1440, Maher v. Roe

Dear Lewis,

Upon the understanding that you are willing to make the minor verbal change on page 6 that we discussed, I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in this case.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference
Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum

-----------------------------------------------------, 19------

billing to acquire it at
under Bill Rehnquist feels
differently and can come
up with another alternative
satisfactory to you.

Many thanks for giving
me a "much needed" gift.

P.S.
April 29, 1977

Re: No. 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe

Dear Lewis:

I think I shall wait for the dissent in this case before finally coming to rest.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20543

June 1, 1977


Dear Lewis:

Please join me in your circulation of May 6, 1977.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.

It is all too obvious that the governmental actions in these cases, ostensibly taken to "encourage" women to carry pregnancies to term, are in reality intended to impose a moral viewpoint that no state may constitutionally enforce. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Since efforts to overturn those decisions have been unsuccessful, the opponents of abortion have attempted every imaginable means to circumvent the commands of the Constitution and impose their moral choices upon the rest of society. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); 428 U.S. 132 (1976). The present cases involve the most vicious attacks yet devised. The impact of the regulations here falls tragically upon those among us least able to help or defend themselves. As the Court well knows, these regulations inevitably
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 31, 1977

Re: No. 75-1440, Maher v. Roe

Dear Bill:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

T. M.

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc: The Conference
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.

It is all too obvious that the governmental actions in these cases, ostensibly taken to "encourage" women to carry pregnancies to term, are in reality intended to impose a moral viewpoint that no state may constitutionally enforce. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Since efforts to overturn those decisions have been unsuccessful, the opponents of abortion have attempted every imaginable means to circumvent the commands of the Constitution and impose their moral choices upon the rest of society. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 52 (1976);/428 U.S. 132 (1976). The present cases involve the most vicious attacks yet devised. The impact of the regulations here falls tragically upon those among us least able to help or defend themselves. As the Court well knows, these regulations inevitably
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C. 20543

June 1, 1977

Re: No. 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe

Dear Bill:

Please join me in your dissent.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc: The Conference
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

April 15, 1977

No. 75-1440  Maher v. Roe

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I circulate herewith a first draft of a proposed opinion for the Court in the above case.

This case addresses the constitutional issue. I also am writing Beal v. Doe that involves the statutory question. Normally, I would circulate both opinions at the same time, but it will be perhaps another week before I have a first printed draft of Beal.

L.F.P., Jr.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Beal v. Doe, ante, at —, we hold today that Title XIX of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of nontherapeutic abortions as a condition of participation in the joint federal-state medicaid program established by that statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in Beal, we must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for childbirth.

I

A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits state medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions to those that are "medically necessary," a term defined to include psychiatric necessity. Connecticut Welfare Department, Public Assistance Program Manual, Vol. 3, c. III, § 275.² Connecticut

¹ The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not challenged here.
² Section 275 provides in relevant part:
"The Department makes payment for abortion services under the Medical Assistance (Title XIX) Program when the following conditions are met:
"1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medi-
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

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\(^1\) The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not challenged here.

\(^2\) Section 275 provides in relevant part:

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3 The procedures governing abortions beyond the first trimester are not challenged here.

2 Section 275 provides in relevant part:

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Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court.

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1. In the opinion of the attending physician the abortion is medi-
Supreme Court of the United States  
Washington, D. C. 20543  

CHAMBERS OF  
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.  

June 13, 1977  

75-1440 Maher v. Roe (and associated cases)  

Dear Bill:  

In view of your extensive changes circulating today, and other opinions that are now engaging my full attention, it may be a couple of days before I decide whether to make any response.  

I, therefore, see little possibility of bringing these cases down on Thursday.  

Sincerely,  

[Signature]  

Mr. Justice Brennan  

Copies to the Conference  
LFP/lab
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In *Beal v. Doe*, ante, at —, we hold today that Title XIX of the Social Security Act does not require the funding of nontherapeutic abortions as a condition of participation in the joint federal-state medicaid program established by that statute. In this case, as a result of our decision in *Beal*, we must decide whether the Constitution requires a participating State to pay for nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for childbirth.

I


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April 28, 1977

Re: No. 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe

Dear Lewis:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference
April 18, 1977

Re: 75-1440 - Maher v. Roe

Dear Lewis:

Please join me.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Mr. Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference