The Burger Court Opinion Writing Database

American Radio Association v. Mobile Steamship Association, Inc.

419 U.S. 215 (1974)

Paul J. Wahlbeck, George Washington University
James F. Spriggs, II, Washington University in St. Louis
Forrest Maltzman, George Washington University

73-748

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICE

November 1, 1974

case?

73-743 Am Radio

Dear Bill:

My notes for my summary at the Conference reflect that I mentioned both Curry and Organization for a Better Austin, and that I favored a Dismiss as Improvidently Granted but there were not five -- or indeed even two -- for that disposition.

I can also join in a disposition based on "no final judgment" as you suggest.

Regards,

WEB

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

cc: Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICE

November 27, 1974

Re: No. 73-748 - American Radio Association, AFL-CIO, et al.
v. Mobile Steamship Association, Inc., et al.

Dear Bill:

I will concur in the above case with the attached opinion.

Regards,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

Copies to the Conference

To: Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

From: The Chief Justice

Circulated: NOV 27 1974

Recirculated: _____

No. 73-748 - American Radio Association, AFL-CIO, et al. v. Mobile Steamship Association, Inc., et al.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in part and in the judgment.

I agree with the Court's opinion in holding that the Alabama courts' jurisdiction was not preempted by federal law. However, I do not believe that we have jurisdiction to reach the merits of petitioners' First Amendment claim because it was not disposed of by a final judgment or decree as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

As the Court's opinion notes, the Alabama Supreme Court properly recognized that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not provide an absolute bar to restraints upon labor picketing. In so doing it expressly refrained from passing on the merits of petitioners' First Amendment defense claim, but confined its review to a determination of whether the Alabama Circuit Court abused its discretion in granting pendente lite relief. Concluding that no abuse had occurred, the Alabama

Supreme Court remanded for a full hearing on the substantial factual questions involved.

A similar temporary injunction granted by an Alabama court was before us in Montgomery Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Ledbetter, 344 U.S. 178 (1952). We held that such an order did not satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and dismissed the writ as improvidently granted, observing that finality "is not one of those technicalities to be easily scorned. It is an important factor in the smooth working of our federal system." 344 U.S. 180. The Ledbetter holding ought to be dispositive of the finality question here. True, it was limited in Local No. 438 Constr. & General Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963), the case relied upon by the Court, but only insofar as it refused to decide "a substantial claim that the jurisdiction of the state court is pre-empted by federal law." 371 U.S. 552. We were careful to point out in Curry that a decision on the preemption issue would not necessarily mean that we had jurisdiction to review the merits:

> "Whether or not the Georgia courts have power to issue an injunction is a matter wholly separate from and independent of the merits of respondents' cause. The issue on the merits, namely the legality of the union's picketing, is a matter entirely apart from the determination of whether the Georgia court or the National Labor Relations Board should conduct the trial of the issue." 371 U.S. 548.

A second reason for concluding that we had jurisdiction in Curry was that the decision of the state appellate court left nothing of substance to be decided. 371 U.S. 550-51. But that is not the case here. The critical question of whether the purpose and effect of the picketing was to frustrate a valid public policy remains very much in dispute, and can be resolved only after a full trial. Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court decided only that the Circuit Court had not abused its discretion in concluding that the status quo should be maintained pending that trial. Of course, petitioners are as effectively prevented from picketing during the life of the temporary injunction as if they had lost on the merits. However, that is an inevitable result of the final judgment rule and cannot by itself confer jurisdiction upon us. Montgomery Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Ledbetter, supra, 344 U.S. 180.

I would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted on the First Amendment issue.

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
THE CHIEF JUSTICE

December 2, 1974

Re: 73-748 - American Radio Association, AFL-CIO, et al
v. Mobile Steamship Association, Inc. et al

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

On further reflection I conclude I will withdraw my proposed concurring opinion sent out last week. The point can be dealt with "another day".

Regards,

WEB

P. S. -- In short, I concur in your opinion. --WEB

November 23, 1974

Dear Potter:

I like your opinion in American Radio Association, No. 73-748, as you will see from a dissent whibh I will shortly circulate.

Would you consider deleting the first sentence in your dissent? Then I would join it.

William O. Douglas

Mr. Justice Stewart

[redacted]

Wm. Douglas
OCT 74

To : The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

3rd DRAFT

From: Douglas; J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-748

Circulate: 11-29

Recirculate: _____

American Radio Association, AFL-CIO, et al., Petitioners, *v.* Mobile Steamship Association, Inc., et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

[December —, 1974]

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting.

I agree with my Brother STEWART that the dispute in the present case is within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and that that jurisdiction is exclusive of state jurisdiction. The foreign-flag ship involved in the present controversy is Liberian. Hence I add a few observations generated by Noel Mostert's *Supership* (1974) discussing the problems of the big new oil tankers and their vast pollution of the oceans of the world. He puts Liberian flag ships in the following perspective:

> "Liberia now has the world's largest merchant marine, followed by Japan and Britain, and her lead is rapidly increasing; flag of convenience fleets have regularly grown at rates more than twice those of world fleets as a whole. Liberia and Panama together now own, on paper, nearly a quarter of world shipping. Tankers dominate these expatriate fleets.
>
> "Thirty-five to 40 percent of the Liberian tonnage is American-owned, and an additional 10 percent of it is American-financed, which helps explain where the American merchant fleet, in steady decline since the end of the war, has taken itself. According to law, American-flag ships must be built in the United

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 18, 1974

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re: No. 73-748, American Radio Association v. Mobile S.S. Association

I expect to circulate a dissenting opinion in this case in due course.

P.S.

1st DRAFT

From: Stewart, J.

Circulated: NOV 22 1974

Recirculated: _____

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-748

American Radio Association, AFL-CIO, et al., Petitioners, v. Mobile Steamship Association, Inc., et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

[November —, 1974]

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting.

I fully accept the doctrine of *Windward Shipping (London) Ltd.* v. *American Radio Assn.*, 415 U. S. 104. The issue in the present case, however, is quite different from the issue decided last Term in that case.

In *Windward Shipping*, the owners and managing agents of two foreign-flag vessels sought injunctive relief in state courts in Texas to bar picketing of their vessels by several American maritime unions. The unions were attempting to publicize the competitive advantage enjoyed by foreign-flag vessels because of the substantial disparity between foreign and domestic seamen's wages. The vessels' owners and managing agents asked the state courts to enjoin the picketing as tortious under Texas law. The primary basis for this claim was that the picketing sought to induce the foreign-flag vessel owners and their foreign crews to break pre-existing contracts. The Texas courts concluded that they lacked jurisdiction to consider the complaint of interference with contract because the dispute between the foreign-flag shipowners and the American unions was "arguably" within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.

In reversing the judgment of the Texas Court of Appeals, this Court reaffirmed earlier cases that had recog-

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-748

American Radio Association, AFL-CIO, et al., Petitioners, *v.* Mobile Steamship Association, Inc., et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

[November —, 1974]

MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN join, dissenting.

The issue in the present case is quite different from the issue decided last Term in *Windward Shipping (London) Ltd.* v. *American Radio Assn.*, 415 U. S. 104. Because the dispute in this case clearly "affects commerce" and thus falls within the exclusive regulatory power of the National Labor Relations Board, I would reverse the judgment before us.

In *Windward Shipping*, the owners and managing agents of two foreign-flag vessels sought injunctive relief in state courts in Texas to bar picketing of their vessels by several American maritime unions. The unions were attempting to publicize the competitive advantage enjoyed by foreign-flag vessels because of the substantial disparity between foreign and domestic seamen's wages. The vessels' owners and managing agents asked the state courts to enjoin the picketing as tortious under Texas law. The primary basis for this claim was that the picketing sought to induce the foreign-flag vessel owners and their foreign crews to break pre-existing contracts. The Texas courts concluded that they lacked jurisdiction to consider the complaint of interference with contract because the dispute between the foreign-flag shipowners and the

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

November 26, 1974

Re: No. 73-748 - American Radio Association v. Mobile Steamship Association

Dear Bill:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

Copies to Conference

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

November 29, 1974

Re: No. 73-748 -- American Radio Association, AFL--CIO, et al., v. Mobile Steamship Association, Inc., et al.

Dear Potter:

Please join me in your dissenting opinion.

Sincerely,

TM

T.M.

Mr. Justice Stewart

cc: The Conference

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

November 27, 1974

Re: No. 73-748 - American Radio Association
v. Mobile S.S. Association

Dear Bill:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

Harry

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

cc: The Conference

November 5, 1974

No. 73-748 American Radio Assn. v.
Mobile Steamship Assn.

Dear Bill:

Referring to your memorandum of November 1, I would prefer to write the opinion with respect to the First Amendment issue along the lines suggested in the last paragraph on page 5 of your memo.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

lfp/ss

cc: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Blackmun

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

November 19, 1974

No. 73-748 American Radio Association v.
Mobile Steamship Association

Dear Bill:

I remain troubled by the issue of "finality" with respect to our reviewing the First Amendment issue.

I will join you on the preemption issue and agree with the merits of what you have written on the First Amendment issue, if it is properly before us. As to the latter question, I will need a little time to think about it further. I have been concerned by the trend of some of our recent decisions as to finality for purposes of review by this Court.

Sincerely,

L. Lewis

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

lfp/ss

cc: The Conference

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.

December 12, 1974

No. 73-748 American Radio v. Mobile

Dear Bill:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

Lewis

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

lfp/ss

cc: The Conference

HAB

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

November 1, 1974

MEMORANDUM TO: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell

Re: No. 73-748-American Radio Assn. v. Mobile Steamship Assn.

Five of us -- the Chief, Byron, Harry, Lewis, and I -- voted in Conference that state court jurisdiction in this case was not pre-empted by the NLRA, and that the state court had not abridged petitioner's First Amendment rights in issuing a temporary injunction against the picketing. Respondent argued in its brief that this was not a "final judgment" within the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and petitioner replied that our jurisdiction was established by Byron's opinion in Local 438 v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963), and the Chief's opinion in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418 (1971). As I recall the Conference discussion, all of us at least implicitly agreed with petitioner's contention, and virtually no attention was devoted to this point in the Conference discussion.

In preparing to draft an opinion in this case, I have decided that while Curry holds that the state court's determination that its jurisdiction was not pre-empted by the NLRA is a final judgment for purposes of our review, it does not speak to the question of whether, after we have completed

that review, we may go on to treat other federal questions raised by the petitioners. In Curry the Court concluded that state jurisdiction had been pre-empted, and there was therefore no occasion for it to reach any other federal questions upon which the petitioners there relied. Byron's opinion analogized a state court's jurisdictional ruling in this situation to the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), and contains, inter alia, the following language:

> "The issue ripe for review is not whether a Georgia court has erroneously decided a matter of federal law in a case admittedly within its jurisdiction . . . What we do have here is a judgment of the Georgia court finally and erroneously asserting its jurisdiction to deal with a controversy which is beyond its power . . . .
>
> "Whether or not the Georgia courts have power to issue an injunction is a matter entirely apart from the determination of whether the Georgia court or the NLRB should conduct the trial of the issue. . . .
>
> "There is no doubt that the jurisdiction of the Georgia courts has been finally determined by the judgment below and is not subject to further review in the state courts." 371 U.S., at 548-50.

My reading of Curry leads me to think it leaves entirely open the question of whether, after we have determined that a state court's jurisdiction was not pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act, we are free under the "final judgment" provision of section 1257 to go on and review other federal questions urged.

The second basis upon which petitioners support their contention that we do have jurisdiction (I think it is fair to say that neither petitioners nor respondents distinguish in their briefs between our jurisdiction over the pre-emption question and our jurisdiction to review the First Amendment claim) is that for all practical purposes the fight was over in the state court. The Chief's opinion in Keefe, supra, contains this language supporting our jurisdiction to review in such a situation:

> "We see nothing in the record that would indicate that the Illinois courts applied a less rigorous standard in issuing and sustaining this injunction than they would with any permanent injunction in the case. Nor is there any indication that the injunction rests on a disputed question of fact that might be resolved differently upon further hearing. Indeed, our reading of the record leads to the conclusion that the issuance of a permanent injunction upon termination of these proceedings will be little more than a formality. Moreover, the temporary injunction here, which has been in effect for over three years, has already had marked impact on petitioner's First Amendment rights. Although the record in this case is not such as to leave the matter entirely free from doubt we conclude we are not without power to decide this case. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Construction Laborers' Local 438 v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963)." 402 U.S. 415, 418.

My difficulty withsustaining our jurisdiction to review the First Amendment contention, after we have decided that the state court's jurisdiction is not pre-empted, is that I do not think a fair reading of the Alabama Supreme Court's

opinion indicates that it was intended to be, or as a practical matter is, a final disposition of the factual or legal issues in the case. Reviewing the testimony of a local union official, that court concluded that there was a "substantial question" that an

> "intended purpose of the picketing was interference with [respondent's] business, which was the loading and unloading of ships. This situation called on the trial judge to exercise his discretion as to whether or not to grant a temporary injunction to maintain the status quo until a full hearing could be had . . . on the merits of the case. In his decision, he did not, in our opinion, abuse his discretion." App. at 26a.

Nor does North Dakota Pharmacy Board v. Snyder's Stores, 414 U.S. 156 (1974) touch this situation. There we found that the state court decision was final, despite remand for further administrative action, because we could discover "no way which the licensing authority . . . has of preserving the constitutional question now ripe for decision.

My present impression is that the question of our jurisdiction to review the First Amendment claim is open under both Curry and Keefe lines of cases. Unless we can find precedent supporting some sort of "ancillary" or "pendent" jurisdiction, I think our going on to review the First Amendment claim on its merits would be about the last step in completely reading out of section 1257 the language "final judgments or decrees". So far as I can recall from whatever experience I had in practice, together with a hasty review of our decisions, "ancillary jurisdiction" is a doctrine

developed to give the district courts jurisdiction over impleaded third party defendants and the like, when there is the necessary diversity or federal question jurisdiction as between the original plaintiff and the original defendant. See, e.g., Stemler v. Burke, 344 F. 2d 393 (CA 6 1965). The related principle of "pendent jurisdiction" permits federal courts to decide a state-law issue in a federal-question case. U.M.W. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). In each instance the justification appears to be that the ancillary and principal questions are sufficiently closely related that they should be decided by the same court. Even if we were to transplant these doctrines to section 1257, I am not sure that the relation of these two issues -- First Amendment and pre-emption under the National Labor Relations Act -- is sufficiently close to qualify.

Our decisions do hold that we have authority to decide questions which could not themselves have been brought here by way of appeal if they are presented in a case which presents at least one issue which is properly appealable. Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 263 (1944); Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 547 (1922). But I don't think that this doctrine amounts to much more than saying that review may be had in such cases of issues which could have been raised by certiorari without the formality of filing a petition for certiorari in addition to a jurisdictional statement.

All of this leaves me with a preference for writing the Court's opinion to say that the state court jurisdiction was not pre-empted, and that since the decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama simply upheld the issuance of a temporary injunction, we have no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to review petitioners' claim that the injunction actually issued infringed their First Amendment rights.

However, partly because of my warm heart, and partly because I am writing a proposed Court opinion which appears to have a maximum of five adherents, including me, I am perfectly willing to write it in accordance with what I conceive to have been the Conference deliberations if any of you would prefer to have it done that way. I would think that the most faithful reflection of the Conference deliberation would be to treat the question with a lick and a promise, by saying that a state court determination that it has jurisdiction to issue such an injunction is final under Curry, and going on to treat the First Amendment claim without indicating that it is anything other than the tail following the dog.

Please advise me of your wishes.

Sincerely,

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice [illegible]
Mr. Justice [illegible]
Mr. Justice [illegible]
Mr. Justice [illegible]
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell
[illegible]ist, J.

11-15-74

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-748

American Radio Association, AFL-CIO, et al., Petitioners, v. Mobile Steamship Association, Inc., et al. | On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

[November —, 1974]

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners are the six maritime unions which appeared before this Court as respondents in *Windward Shipping (London) Ltd.* v. *American Radio Assn., AFL-CIO*, 415 U. S. 104 (1974). We granted their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama, 415 U. S. 947, in order to review their contentions that this case was distinguishable from *Windward* on the pre-emption issue, and that the temporary injunction upheld by that court had infringed rights guaranteed to them under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.[1]

As in *Windward*, this case arises from picketing designed to publicize the adverse impact on American sea-

[1] The decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reported at 279 So. 2d 467 (1973). Because that court validated only a temporary injunction, and remanded for trial on the merits, an issue has been raised as to our jurisdiction to consider this case. We think that *Local No. 438, Construction and General Laborers Union* v. *Curry*, 371 U. S. 542 (1963), is conclusive of the finality of the judgment below for the purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1257.

8, 10, 11

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell

From: Rehnquist, J.

Circulated: _____

Recirculated: 11/26/74

3rd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 73-748

American Radio Association, AFL–CIO, et al., Petitioners, *v.* Mobile Steamship Association, Inc., et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

[November —, 1974]

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

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As in *Windward,* this case arises from picketing designed to publicize the adverse impact on American sea-

[1] The decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reported at 279 So. 2d 467 (1973). Because that court validated only a temporary injunction, and remanded for trial on the merits, an issue has been raised as to our jurisdiction to consider this case. We think that *Local No. 438, Construction and General Laborers Union* v. *Curry,* 371 U. S. 542 (1963), is conclusive of the finality of the judgment below for the purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1257.

STYLISTIC CHANGES THROUGHOUT

See P.14

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell

4th DRAFT

From: Rehnquist, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Circulated: _____

No. 73-748

Recirculated: 12/2/74

American Radio Association, AFL-CIO, et al., Petitioners, *v.* Mobile Steamship Association, Inc., et al.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

[November —, 1974]

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners are the six maritime unions which appeared before this Court as respondents in *Windward Shipping (London) Ltd.* v. *American Radio Assn., AFL-CIO,* 415 U. S. 104 (1974). We granted their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama, 415 U. S. 947, in order to review their contentions that this case was distinguishable from *Windward* on the pre-emption issue, and that the temporary injunction upheld by that court had infringed rights guaranteed to them under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.[1]

As in *Windward,* this case arises from picketing designed to publicize the adverse impact on American sea-

[1] The decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reported at 279 So. 2d 467 (1973). Because that court validated only a temporary injunction, and remanded for trial on the merits, an issue has been raised as to our jurisdiction to consider this case. We think that *Local No. 438, Construction and General Laborers Union* v. *Curry,* 371 U. S. 542 (1963), is conclusive of the finality of the judgment below for the purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 1257.

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20543

Grant

February 21, 1974

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re: No. 73-748 - American Radio Assoc., AFL-CIO, et al. v. Mobile Steamship Assoc., Inc.

This case, which appeared on page 2 of the February 15th Conference was relisted pending announcement of the Court's decision in No. 72-1061 - Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Association, AFL-CIO. The case comes before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama.

Petitioners in this case are the labor unions who were the respondents in Windward Shipping. As they had in Houston, Texas, the unions here peacefully picketed two foreign flag vessels in Mobile, Alabama with signs stating:

> "Attention to the Public
>
> The wages and benefits paid aboard the vessel SS Aqua Gloria and the SS Bel Hudson are sub-standard to those of the American seamen. This results in extreme damage to our wage standard and the loss of our jobs.
>
> Please do not patronize these vessels. Help the American seamen. We have no dispute with other vessels at this site."

Wm. Douglas
OK 74