The Burger Court Opinion Writing Database

Toussie v. United States 397 U.S. 112 (1970)

Paul J. Wahlbeck, George Washington University James F. Spriggs, II, Washington University Forrest Maltzman, George Washington University









Supreme Court of the Anited States Mashington, P. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF

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February 19, 1970

Re: No. 441 - Toussie v. U. S.

Dear Byron:

I join in your dissent.

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W. E. B.

Mr. Justice White

cc: The Conference

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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From: Black, J.

Circulated: FEB

To: The Chie.

Mr. Justice Douglas Mr. Justice Harlan Mr. Justice Brennan Mr. Justice Stewart Mr. Justice White Mr. Justice Fortas.

Mr. Justice Marshall

No. 441.—October Term, 1969

Robert I. Toussie, Petitioner, v.

United States.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

[February -, 1970]

MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner Robert Toussie was convicted, after a jury trial, of failing to register for the draft. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 410 F. 2d 1156-(C. A. 2d Cir.), and we granted certiorari, 396 U. S. 875-(1969). For the reasons hereafter set forth we conclude that this prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations and therefore reverse the conviction.

Section 3 of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 65 Stat 76, provides that:

"Except as otherwise provided in this title, it shall be the duty of every male citizen . . . who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder."¹

¹ 50 U. S. C. App. § 453. This Act was amended by the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 62 Stat. 604, but those amendments did not change this provision. Failure to perform this duty is punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both. 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a).

To: The Chief Justice Mr. Justice Douglas Mr. Justice Harlan Mr. Justice Brennan Mr. Justice Stewart Mr. Justice White Mr. Justice Fortas Mr. Justice Marshall

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From: Black, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES lated Recirculate FEB 1 8 197

No. 441.—October Term, 1969

Robert I. Toussie,

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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
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February 24, 1970

Re: No. 441 - Toussie v. United States

Dear Hugo:

This, as straightforwardly recognized in your opinion, is a very close case and I have been bothered by it considerably. After mature reflection, I have decided to withdraw from your opinion and to join Brother White who, I am persuaded, has the better of the argument. Needless to say I leave you with reluctance.

Sincerely,

J. M. H.

Mr. Justice Black

CC: The Conference

Dear Byron:

Please join me in your dissent. I have one suggestion to put to you: Hugo's opinion takes the flat position that a continuing offense cannot be found in the absence of express statutory language, whereas the Model Penal Code correctly, I think, takes the view that there is only a presumption against continuing offenses. It seems to me that it would strengthen your opinion if you indicated such a thought at some appropriate point in your opinion. The two places that occur to me would be either after the point in the last paragraphoof your opinion from which footnote 19 is dropped, or at the end of the second paragraph of the opinion.

Sincerely,

J.M.H.

No. 411 Rei

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Supreme Çourt of the United States Washington, P. G. 20543

CHAMBERS OF JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN, JR.

February 16, 1970

RE: No. 441 - Toussie v. United States

Dear Hugo:

I agree with your opinion in the above

case.

Sincerely,

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Mr. Justice Black

cc: The Conference

Supreme Court of the Anited States Washington, D. C. 20543

February 16, 1970

No. 441 - Toussie v. U. S.

Dear Hugo,

CHAMBERS OF

I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in this case.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Black

Copies to the Conference

To: The Chief Justice Mr. Justice Black Mr. Justice Douglas Mr. Justice Harlan Mr. Justice Brennan Mr. Justice Stewart Mr. Justice Fortas Mr. Justice Marshal

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: White, J.

No. 441.—October Term, 1969

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Circulated: 2-17-70

Recirculated:____

Robert I. Toussie, Petitioner, v. United States.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

[February —, 1970]

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting.

The general statute of limitations provides in pertinent part that "except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted . . . unless the indictment is found . . . within five years next after such offense shall have been committed." 18 U. S. C. § 3282. The majority holds that this statute bars petitioner's prosecution, shortly before his 26th birthday, for failing ever to have registered for the draft. That conclusion, I submit, is supported by neither the language, the purpose, or the history of the applicable Selective Service Acts.

It is at once clear that nothing is gained by stressing that the general statute of limitations applies "except as otherwise expressly provided by law." The question in this case is not whether the five-year statute applies, but when it begins to run. That question in turn depends on what the "offense" is for which petitioner is being tried, and when it was that he committed that offense. In the typical case, an offense is complete as soon as every element in the crime occurs, and the statute of limitations begins to run from that date. But in the case of a "continuing offense," the crime is not exhausted for purposes of the statute of limitations as long as the proscribed course of conduct continues. United States v. Cores, 356 U. S. 405, 409 (1958); United States v.

101-6,12

To: The Chief Justice Mr. Justice Black Mr. Justice Douglas Mr. Justice Harlan Mr. Justice Brennan Mr. Justice Stewart Mr. Justice Fortas Mr. Justice Marshall

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES" White, J.

No. 441.—October Term, 1969

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On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

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<u>,</u>	Mr.	Justice	Douglas
	Mr.	Justice	Harlan'
		Justice	
			Stewart
	Mr.	Justice	Forlas
	Mr.	Justice	Marshall
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 'om: White, J.

No. 441.—October Term, 1969

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Recirculated: 2-25

Circulated:

Robert I. Toussie, Petitioner, v. United States.

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CHAMBERS OF

February 18, 1970

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