The Burger Court Opinion Writing Database

Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States 397 U.S. 72 (1970)

Paul J. Wahlbeck, George Washington University James F. Spriggs, II, Washington University Forrest Maltzman, George Washington University











Supreme Court of the Anited States Washington, P. C. 20543

February 10, 1970

Re: Colonnade Catering Corp. v. U. S.

Lord Smark

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

When I first received Justice Douglas' proposed opinion it had me almost persuaded because of its narrow basis and thrust. However, his elimination of the constitutional issues carried me back to the controlling statutes with the result indicated in the attached dissent. The case is not important in itself but it may well have unanticipated impact on other inspection statutes.

If four will join me I would be happy to convert this into a majority opinion!

W. E. B.

To: Mr. Justice Black
Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Justice Harlan
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White

(o. 108 - Colonnade Catering Corporation v. United States Justice Marshall

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.

Circulated: ∝

Since my basis of disagreement with the majority varies

Recirculated:
somewhat from that of Mr. Justice Black, I set it forth separately.

I assume we could all agree that the search in question must be held valid, and the contraband discovered subject to seizure and forfeiture, unless (a) it is "unreasonable" under the Constitution or (b) it is prohibited by a statute imposing restraints apart from those in the Constitution. The majority sees no constitutional violation; I agree.

The controlling statutes set out in notes 1 and 2 of the majority opinion affirmatively define the conditions and times when agents may enter premises and inspect. Under 26 U.S.C. 5146(b) agents may enter to inspect "any distilled spirits, wines or beer kept or stored by such dealer on such premises." The time when this may be done is fixed as "during business hours." Section 7606 of 26 U.S.C. set forth in note 2 of the majority opinion provides that agents may enter any building where taxable articles are kept, "so far as it may be necessary for the purpose of examining said articles or objects."

Supreme Court of the United States Washington, P. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 11, 1970

Re: No. 108 - Colonnade Catering Corp. v. U. S.

Dear Hugo:

I had intended my dissent to reflect that I join yours and I will amend the first sentence to do so plainly.

W.E.B.

Mr. Justice Black

cc: The Conference

Supreme Court of the United States Washington, B. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 12, 1970

Re: No. 108 - Colonnade Catering Corp. v. U. S.

Dear Hugo:

Since I agree with your opinion and now recite that more clearly, I wish to be shown as joining on the face of your opinion. If you and Potter both decide to join mine I will amend my opinion accordingly.

W.E.B.

Mr. Justice Black

cc: Mr. Justice Stewart

Supreme Court of the United States Washington 25. D. C.

CHAMBERS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Attached by proper clip to your Suft.

Colourade

ro: We. Jostino Black 🖊 Mr. Justice Domylas No. Justina Hamban

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 108.—OCTOBER TERM, 1969

From: The Calot Publica

Circulated:_

The Colonnade Catering Corp.,) On Writ of Certiogari Petitioner.

v.

United States.

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

[February 25, 1970]

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE Black and Mr. Justice Stewart join, dissenting.

I join in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black; however since my position goes somewhat beyond his discussion I add my views separately.

I assume we could all agree that the search in question must be held valid, and the contraband discovered subject to seizure and forfeiture, unless (a) it is "unreasonable" under the Constitution or (b) it is prohibited by a statute imposing restraints apart from those in the Constitution. The majority sees no constitutional violation; I agree.

The controlling statutes set out in notes 1 and 2 of

10:		Justice	
	$M\mathbf{r}$.	Justice	Douglas
	Mr.	Justice	Harlan
	$\mathbb{M}r$,	Instice	Brennan 🖊
	M2*.	Jactice	Stewart
	Mr.	ne sica	White
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	in ter	Dwatien	Hershall

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

From: The Chief Justice

No. 108.—October Term, 1969

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The Colonnade Catering Corp., On Writ of Certionaria 2 2/24/7 6 Petitioner, v.

United States.

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The government agents needed neither a warrant nor these statutes to secure entry to this place of business The Chief No. 108 - Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States

Mr. Justice Brode

Mr. Justice Harle

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.

Wr. Justice Breman

Mr. Justice Stewart

Mr. Justice White

Mr. Justice Fortas

Petitioner brought proceedings under the Federal Rules

Mr. Justice Marshall

of Criminal Procedure for the return of liquor seized by federal m: Black, J.

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unlawful search and seizure may move the district court... for the

return of the property ... so obtained on the ground that (1) the property

was illegally seized without a warrant ... "Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 41(e)

(emphasis added). As I read that provision, it requires petitioner to show

that the seizure in this case was illegal, either because it violated the

Fourth Amendment, or because it was in violation of some law passed

by Congress. In my opinion neither requirement has been met and therefore

petitioner is not entitled to a return of the seized liquor.

There can be no doubt that the retail liquor business has historically been subjected to strict governmental scrutiny for many centuries both in this country and in England. The Court sets out a little of the history of that regulation in its opinion. I therefore agree that

1 : Ab Tourth Amendment

To: The Chief Justice

Mr. Justice Douglas

Justice Harlan

Justice Brennan

Justice Stewart

Mr. Justice White

Justice Fertas

Justice Marshall

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ... Black, J.

Circulated:

No. 108.—October Term, 1969

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The Colonnade Catering Corp.,) On Writ of Certiorari Petitioner,

United States.

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

[February —, 1970]

Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins, dissenting.

Petitioner brought proceedings under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the return of liquor seized by federal agents. One of those rules provides that "[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court . . . for the return of the property... so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without a warrant " Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 41 (e). (Emphasis added.) As I read that provision, it requires petitioner to show that the seizure in this case was illegal, either because it violated the Fourth Amendment, or because it was in violation of some law passed by Congress. In my opinion neither requirement has been met and therefore petitioner is not entitled to a return of the seized liquor.

There can be no doubt that the retail liquor business has historically been subjected to strict governmental scrutiny for many centuries both in this country and in England. The Court sets out a little of the history of that regulation in its opinion. I therefore agree that there is nothing unreasonable, as that term is used in the Fourth Amendment, in permitting officers to go into an open, public tavern, and upon finding something that indicates a flagrant violation of the law to pursue their examination to see whether a violation is actually occur-

Mr. Justice Dougla Justice Harlan Justice Brend a Justice Stewar astice White Justice For a Justice Marshall

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

From: Black, J.

No. 108.—October Term, 1969

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The Colonnade Catering Corp., On Writ of Certiforatirculated. FEB 12 13/4 Petitioner, v. United States.

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There can be no doubt that places which sell liquor to the public have historically been subjected to strict governmental scrutiny for many centuries both in this country and in England. The Court sets out a little of the history of that regulation in its opinion. I therefore agree that there is nothing unreasonable, as that term is used in the Fourth Amendment, in permitting officers to go into an establishment that provides alcoholic beverages to the public, and upon finding something that indicates a flagrant violation of the law to pursue their examination to see whether a violation is actually occur-

To: The Chief Justice

Mr. Justice Pouglas

Mr. Justice Farlan

Mr. Justice Stewart

Mr. Justice Stewart

Mr. Justice White

Mr. Justice Tortas

Mr. Justice Larshall

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 108.—October Term, 1969

From: Black, J.

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Febraary 24, 1970

Dear Chief,

Re: No. 108 - Colonnade Catering v. U.S.

Please join me in your dissenting opinion in the above case.

Sincerely,

H. L. B.

The Chief Justice

To: The Calef Justice
Mr. Justice Black
Mr. Justice Harlan
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Fortas
Mr. Justice Marshall

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES USLAS, 130/30/

No. 108.—OCTOBER TERM, 1969

The Colonnade Catering Corp., On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

v. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

[February —, 1970]

Mr. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner, a licensee in New York, authorized to serve alcoholic beverages and also the holder of a federal retail liquor dealer's occupational stamp tax, 26 U. S. C. § 5121 (a), brought this suit to obtain the return of seized liquor and its suppression as evidence. The District Court granted the relief. The Court of Appeals reversed. 410 F. 2d 197. The case is here on a petition for writ of certiorari which we granted, to review the decision in light of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 544.

Petitioner runs a catering establishment. A federal agent, member of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service, was a guest at a party on petitioner's premises and noted a possible violation of the federal excise tax law. When the federal agents later visited the place, another party was in progress. They noticed that liquor was being served. Without the manager's consent they inspected the cellar. Then they asked the manager to open the locked liquor storeroom. He said that the only person authorized to open that room was one Rozzo, petitioner's president, who was not on the premises. Later Rozzo arrived and refused to

To: The Chief Justice Justice Black Jamiica Barlan Jestico Brennan Mr. Unabled Stewart

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

Circulated:

No. 108.—October Term, 1969

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The Colonnade Catering Corp.,) On Writ of Certiorari Petitioner, v. United States.

to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

[February —, 1970]

Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court.

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To: The Chief Justice Mr. Justice Black Mr. Justice Harlan Mr. Jackice Brouman Stewart Mr. June so Harbhall

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO SEE THE STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE STATE

No. 108.—October Term, 1969

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The Colonnade Catering Corp., On Writ of Certiorari Petitioner, v.

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[February —, 1970]

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Supreme Court of the Anited States Washington, B. C. 20543

JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN, JR. February 9, 1970

RE: No. 108 - Colonnade Catering Corporation
v. United States.

Dear Bill:

I agree with your opinion in the above case.

Sincerely,

W.J.B. Jr.

Mr. Justice Douglas

cc: The Conference

Supreme Court of the United States Washington, P. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

February 9, 1970

No. 108, Colonnade Catering Corp.

Dear Hugo,

I am glad to join your dissenting opinion in this case.

Sincerely yours,

7.51

Mr. Justice Black

Copies to the Conference

Supreme Court of the Anited States Washington, P. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

February 24, 1970

No. 108 - Colonnade Catering v. U.S.

Dear Chief,

I am glad to join your dissenting opinion in this case.

Sincerely yours,

0.5,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference

Pebroary 9, 1970

Re: No. 108 - The Colombide Catering Corp. v. United States

Dear Bill:

Please join me,

Elmertly,

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AND REAL PROPERTY.

Supreme Court of the United States Washington, P. C. 20543

CHAMBERS OF
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 3, 1970

Re: No. 108 - Colonnade Catering Corp. v. U. S.

Dear Bill:

Please join me.

Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Douglas

cc: The Conference